

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342661395>

Presentation on the application of set-based fault detection to Cyber-physical Systems

Presentation · July 2018

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30774.11841

CITATIONS

0

READS

10

3 authors:



Daniel Silvestre

Instituto Superior Técnico

39 PUBLICATIONS 162 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)



Joao P. Hespanha

University of California, Santa Barbara

521 PUBLICATIONS 40,129 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)



Carlos Silvestre

University of Macao and University of Lisbon

455 PUBLICATIONS 6,585 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



TRIDENT [View project](#)



SHAMAN (Sustaining Heritage Access through Multivalent Archiving), [View project](#)



TÉCNICO
LISBOA



LISBON

Introduction
Problem Statement
Proposed Solution
Results
Simulation Results
Concluding Remarks
References



UC SANTA BARBARA
engineering

Fault Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems: Smart Grid case

D. Silvestre, J. Hespanha and C. Silvestre

23rd Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems
Hong Kong



July 16-20 2015

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Problem Statement
- 3 Proposed Solution
- 4 Results
- 5 Simulation Results
- 6 Concluding Remarks

Motivation

- Sensor Smart Grids - Attacks or errors at the communication network can severely impact on the physical component.
- Robot Coordination - Formations of robots can also be seen as another example of a system with a communication network on top.



Cyber-physical System

- There are various physical components with their own dynamics.
- A communication network to manage the devices.
- We study the particular example of smart grids.
- Main issue: it is required a fast and distributed strategy to detect faults or attacks.

Smart grid model

- A smart grid is composed of:
 - n generator buses;
 - m load buses;
- network can be incorporated using its Laplacian matrix
- Using the dynamic linearized swing equation and the algebraic DC power flow equation, the model becomes:

$$N_c \dot{x}(t) = A_c x(t) + p(t) \quad (1)$$

- state $x = [\delta^T \omega^T \theta^T]^T \in \mathbb{R}^{2n+m}$ with:
 - $\delta \in \mathbb{R}^n$ - generator rotor angles;
 - $\omega \in \mathbb{R}^n$ - frequencies;
 - $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^m$ - bus voltage angles.



Problem Statement

- Given that the network is connected, $\theta(t)$ can be written using the other variables;
- The system is rewritten from an algebraic differential model to a kron-reduced version;
- After discretization, it becomes a Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) model:

$$\begin{aligned} x(k+1) &= Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Ff(k) + Ed(k) \\ y(k) &= Cx(k) + Du(k) + Lf(k) + Nd(k) \end{aligned}, \quad (2)$$

Fault detection problem in Cyber-physical systems

How to perform fault detection without knowledge of the fault inputs? Is it a fast and distributed algorithm?

Centralized solution 1/2

- A node estimates the subnetwork of interest;
- No uncertainty in the model;
- New estimate for the state can be obtained by the inequality:

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} M(k)A^{-1} & -M(k)A^{-1}E \\ \bar{C} & 0 \\ 0 & \bar{I} \end{bmatrix}}_{M(k+1)} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{d} \end{bmatrix} \leq \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} m(k) + \tilde{u}(k) \\ \bar{y}(k+1) + \nu^* \mathbf{1} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{m(k+1)} \quad (3)$$

- Propagation equation

Centralized solution 1/2

- A node estimates the subnetwork of interest;
- No uncertainty in the model;
- New estimate for the state can be obtained by the inequality:

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} M(k)A^{-1} & -M(k)A^{-1}E \\ \bar{C} & 0 \\ 0 & \bar{I} \end{bmatrix}}_{M(k+1)} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{d} \end{bmatrix} \leq \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} m(k) + \tilde{u}(k) \\ \bar{y}(k+1) + \nu^* \mathbf{1} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{m(k+1)} \quad (3)$$

- **Intersection with measurements**



Centralized solution 1/2

- A node estimates the subnetwork of interest;
- No uncertainty in the model;
- New estimate for the state can be obtained by the inequality:

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} M(k)A^{-1} & -M(k)A^{-1}E \\ \bar{C} & 0 \\ 0 & \bar{I} \end{bmatrix}}_{M(k+1)} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{d} \end{bmatrix} \leq \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} m(k) + \tilde{u}(k) \\ \bar{y}(k+1) + \nu^* \mathbf{1} \\ \mathbf{1} \end{bmatrix}}_{m(k+1)} \quad (3)$$

- Bounds on disturbances

Centralized solution 2/2

- The generalized solution exists for singular matrices A
- We can include previous time instants
- If we use a coprime factorization providing $P(z) = G^{-1}(z)Q(z)$ represented in




Figure: Schematic representation of the two coprime systems.

Decentralized solution

- Replace the known matrix A in the centralized version by:

$$A = A_0 + \sum_{\ell=1}^{n_{\Delta}} \Delta_{\ell} A_{\ell} \quad (4)$$

- Uncertainty parameters Δ_{ℓ} are used to represent the unknown dynamics
- The set can be obtained by computing the convex hull for each of the uncertainty vertex:

$$\tilde{X}(k+1) = \text{co} \left(\bigcup_{\theta \in \mathcal{H}} \text{Set}(M_{\theta}(k+1), m_{\theta}(k+1)) \right) \quad (5)$$

Results

- Centralized solution
 - If the system with n states is observable, convergence of the estimates is achieved in n time instants.
- Distributed solution
 - Convergence is governed by the slowest mode.
- In both cases, maximum magnitude for the attacker can be found by solving:


$$\gamma_{\min} \geq \max_{A_H x \leq b_H} x^T P_A x. \quad (6)$$

- P_A defining all the quadratic weights for the fault signals;
- A_H and b_H define the polytope containing all possible states.

Simulation Results (1/2)

Setup: Testbed network of 14 buses from IEEE.


- The average of the fault magnitude decreases with the number of past measurements.
- Attackers have a limited possibility to compromise the state without being detected.



Simulation Results (1/2)


Setup: Testbed network of 14 buses from IEEE.

- The average of the fault magnitude decreases with the number of past measurements.
- Attackers have a limited possibility to compromise the state without being detected.




Simulation Results (2/2)

- The centralized solution detects faults of smaller magnitude.
- Detection was performed at most in n time instants.
- Detection for one of the observers in the network.
- Decentralized solution required a higher magnitude fault to ensure detection.



Simulation Results (2/2)

- The centralized solution detects faults of smaller magnitude.
- Detection was performed at most in n time instants.
- Detection for one of the observers in the network.
- Decentralized solution required a higher magnitude fault to ensure detection.



Concluding Remarks

Contributions:

- We have shown how to perform worst-case fault detection
 - centralized - one node with full knowledge of the network;
 - distributed - various node with a partial view.
- It is possible to give theoretical results about the convergence time;
- Finally, under the framework of distinguishability of models, it was possible to give worst-case bounds on the attacker signal.

References

- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Self-triggered and event-triggered set-valued observers," *Information Sciences*, vol. 426, pp. 61–86, 2018, ISSN: 0020-0255. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.10.029>
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Fault detection for LPV systems using set-valued observers: A coprime factorization approach," *Systems & Control Letters*, vol. 106, pp. 32–39, 2017, ISSN: 0167-6911. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysconle.2017.05.007>
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Set-based fault detection and isolation for detectable linear parameter-varying systems," *International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control*, vol. 27, no. 18, pp. 4381–4397, 2017, rnc.3814, ISSN: 1099-1239. DOI: [10.1002/rnc.3814](https://doi.org/10.1002/rnc.3814)
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Stochastic and deterministic fault detection for randomized gossip algorithms," *Automatica*, vol. 78, pp. 46–60, 2017, ISSN: 0005-1098. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2016.12.011>
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Self-triggered set-valued observers," in *European Control Conference (ECC)*, 2015, pp. 3647–3652. DOI: [10.1109/ECC.2015.7331097](https://doi.org/10.1109/ECC.2015.7331097)
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Finite-time average consensus in a byzantine environment using set-valued observers," in *American Control Conference (ACC)*, 2014, 2014, pp. 3023–3028. DOI: [10.1109/ACC.2014.6859426](https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2014.6859426)
- D. Silvestre, P. Rosa, J. P. Hespanha, *et al.*, "Distributed fault detection using relative information in linear multi-agent networks," *IFAC-PapersOnLine*, vol. 48, no. 21, pp. 446–451, 2015, 9th IFAC Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety for Technical Processes SAFEPROCESS 20, Paris, 2-4 September 2015, ISSN: 2405-8963. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2015.09.567>

The end

- Thank you for your time.



TÉCNICO
LISBOA



LISBON



UC SANTA BARBARA
engineering

Fault Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems: Smart Grid case

D. Silvestre, J. Hespanha and C. Silvestre

23rd Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems
Hong Kong

July 16-20 2015